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In recent years much research has been undertaken regarding the feasi-
bility of the human uterine transplant (UTx) as a treatment for absolute
uterine factor infertility (AUFI). Should it reach clinical application this pro-
cedure would allow such individuals what is often a much-desired oppor-
tunity to become not only social mothers (via adoption or traditional
surrogacy arrangements), or genetic and social mothers (through gesta-
tional surrogacy) but mothers in a social, genetic and gestational sense.
Like many experimental transplantation procedures such as face, hand,
corneal and larynx transplants, UTx as a therapeutic option falls firmly
into the camp of the quality of life (QOL) transplant, undertaken with the
aim, not to save a life, but to enrich one. However, unlike most of these
novel procedures – where one would be unlikely to find a willing living
donor or an ethics committee that would sanction such a donation – the
organs to be transplanted in UTx are potentially available from both living
and deceased donors.
In this article, in the light of the recent nine-case research trial in Swe-
den which used uteri obtained from living donors, and the assertions on
the part of a number of other research teams currently preparing trials
that they will only be using deceased donors, I explore the question of
whether, in the case of UTx, there exist compelling moral reasons to pre-
fer the use of deceased donors despite the benefits that may be associ-
ated with the use of organs obtained from the living.
1. INTRODUCTION
Late 2014 marked the end of a long and hard-fought
race between teams of researchers across the world to
perform the first successful experimental human uterine
transplant (UTx), a procedure designed as a treatment
option for women with absolute Uterine Factor Infertil-
ity (UFI). This condition affects approximately one in
every 500 women worldwide of childbearing age1 and is
an umbrella term covering infertility problems in individ-
uals who either lack a uterus as a result of congenital
abnormality or a previous hysterectomy, or possess a
uterus but due to physiological or anatomical abnormal-
ities are unable to conceive or sustain gestation.2 Such
women cannot be assisted by more mainstream assisted
reproductive technologies such as IVF as these are
designed to treat difficulties in conception, not gestation.
Thus, a successful treatment for UFI has been called the
last frontier3 in reproductive medicine, allowing women
with UFI the opportunity to become, not only social
mothers as they already may via adoption or traditional
surrogacy arrangements, or social and genetic mothers,
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as they can be through gestational surrogacy arrange-
ments, but mothers in a social, genetic, and gestational
sense.
To date only three notable sets of attempts at
human UTx have been performed. The first took place
in Saudi Arabia in 2000,4 the second in Turkey in
2011,5 and the third in Sweden where nine procedures
were undertaken between September 2012 and April
2013.6 A number of other teams including those based
in Japan,7 France,8 the UK,9 Australia10 and the US,11
are also preparing to embark on their first trials of
this procedure and the UK team received ethics
approval for a 10-case trial in September of this year.12
Whilst no live births resulted from the first two
attempts, although pregnancy was achieved briefly in
the Turkish case,13 four live births have now been
recorded in Sweden and more are expected to follow
in late 2015 and early 2016.14
The live birth of a child after human UTx has pro-
vided hope and the possibility of additional choice for
many women with UFI who wish to become mothers
but who are unwilling, unable, or may prefer not to
resort to adoption or surrogacy, for various reasons –
personal, pragmatic, moral and legal. However,
although UTx may offer assistance to those unable to
gestate their own offspring, it also raises a number of
interesting ethical questions. Some of these relate to
the practice itself,15 others to its current status as an
experimental procedure,16 and others still to more
generic concerns regarding the ethics of assisted repro-
ductive technologies. Although such lines of enquiry
warrant close attention, the scope of this article is
more limited and an answer to a more specific ques-
tion is sought. This question is as follows: Taking as a
basis the view that UTx is both a valuable prospective
treatment option for UFI and there exist no compelling
ethical arguments telling against its performance gener-
ally: is the use of deceased donors morally preferable in
UTx research?
There are two main reasons why this question has
been chosen. The first is that there exists considerable
disagreement among researchers as to whether living or
deceased donors should be preferred. The second is the
fact that of existing QOL transplantation procedures
UTx is the only procedure, barring that of the ovary
transplant, for which the use of living donors has been
proposed, sanctioned by an ethics committee and uti-
lized. As such, with an answer to the above question in
mind, the first part of this article examines the views
expressed by researchers performing or preparing to per-
form UTx regarding their preference for deceased or liv-
ing donors while the second looks to the possible moral
reasons that may tell against a preference for living
donors.
4 W. Fageeh et al. Case Report - Transplantation of the Human Uterus.
Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2002; 76: 245–251.
5 M.E. Akar et al. Clinical Pregnancy after Uterus Transplantation. Fer-
til Steril 2013; 100: 1358–1363.
6 M. Brannstrom et al. The First Clinical Uterus Transplantation Trial:
A Six-Month Report. Fertil Steril 2014; 101: 1228–1236.
7 I. Kisu et al. Current Status of Uterus Transplantation in Primates
and Issues for Clinical Application. Fertil Steril 2013;100: 287–288.
8 L. Smith.WomanwithWomb Transplant Gives Birth to Healthy Baby
in Medical Landmark. The Independent, 4 October 2014. Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/
woman-with-womb-transplant-gives-birth-to-healthy-baby-in-medical-
landmark-9774267.html [accessed 29 June 2015].
9 B. Czub. Pregnancy Hope for Womb Transplant Patient BioNews
2014; 740. Available at: http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_392763.asp
[accessed 29 June 2015].
10 S. Dunlevy. Womb Transplants Coming to Australia in 2016 to
Deliver the Chance of Pregnancy to Women without a Womb. News, 6
December 2014. Available at: http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/health/
womb-transplants-coming-to-australia-in-2016-to-deliver-the-chance-of-
a-pregnancy-to-women-without-a-womb/story-fneuz9ev-1227146047542
[accessed 29 June 2015].
11 A. Nair et al. Uterus Transplant: Evidence and Ethics. Ann N YAcad
Sc 2008; 1127: 86.
12 C. Johnston. Womb Transplants: first 10 British women given go-
ahead. The Guardian, 30 September 2015. Available at: http://www.the-
guardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/sep/29/10-women-receive-go-ahead-
for-first-ever-womb-transplants-in-uk [accessed 16 October 2015].
13 Akar et al., op. cit. note 5, p. 1361.
14 M. Brannstrom et al. Livebirth after Uterus Transplantation. Lancet
2014; 385: 607-616.; J. Laurance. Two Women Have Given Birth Using
Wombs Transplanted from Their Mothers - but Are the Risks Involved
Too Great? The Independent, 3 December 2014. Available at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/two-women-
have-given-birth-using-wombs-transplanted-from-their-mothers-but-
are-the-risks-involved-too-great-9901719.html [accessed 29 June
2015].
15 A number of commentators, for example, have asked: whether the
procedure might cater to a faulty belief that certain kinds of parenthood
(gestational and genetic) are more worth seeking than others (social);
whether the prospective benefits to recipients really outweigh the harms
it risks to the recipient, donor and potentially the resulting child;
whether the uterus transplant really caters to the desire to experience
gestation and birth that it promises to, in light of the fact that current
procedures at best result in gestation in an enervated uterus followed by
caesarean section as opposed to vaginal delivery; whether the procedure
is really a more desirable method of begetting a child than existing prac-
tices such as surrogacy; and finally, whether, in light of the high costs
involved and its status as a life-creating rather than life-sustaining treat-
ment, it should receive public funding in nations with fully or partially
socialized medical systems. Some, for example, have asked whether
human research should have begun despite the fact that all attempts
made so far at human UTx have preceded the life birth of an infant after
allogeneic UTx in primates. Others have asked whether possible recipi-
ents can truly give consent to the procedure, at this current time, given
the uncertainty of success and the strongly held desires it caters to.
16 Some, for example, have asked whether human research should have
begun despite the fact that all attempts made so far at human UTx have
preceded the life birth of an infant after allogeneic UTx in primates.
Others have asked whether possible recipients can truly give consent to
the procedure, at this current time, given the uncertainty of success and
the strongly held desires it caters to.
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2. LIVING VS. DECEASED DONATION IN
UTX TRIALS - THE PERSPECTIVES OF
THE RESEARCH TEAMS
Of the 11 notable human UTx procedures performed so
far, all but one has utilized living donors. The first, in
Saudi Arabia, used a living, unrelated donor already
undergoing a radical hysterectomy due to the presence of
benign ovarian cysts.17 The second, in Turkey, used a
deceased (brain dead) multi-organ donor18 and the final
nine, in Sweden, used only live donors, seven of whom
were closely genetically related (mothers/sisters) to the
recipient.19 Yet, despite the recent successes of the Swed-
ish team there has been much debate amongst those cur-
rently preparing trials regarding the question of whether
living or deceased donation should be preferred. Thus,
whilst some teams are considering emulating the Swedish
model such as teams based in Spain20 and Japan21 others
such as in France,22 the UK,23 Belgium24 and at least
one of the four US teams based in New York25 have
stated that their preference lies with the use of deceased
donors.
So, why is this the case? Why are the research teams
currently unable to agree on such a foundational matter?
Within this section, the reasons provided by researchers
on both sides of the debate are outlined and examined.
2.1 A preference for living donors
Those who prefer living donors appeal to two distinct
kinds of benefits as informing their choice. They suggest,
firstly, that the use of living donors will increase the like-
lihood of the transplants success, and secondly, that liv-
ing donors should be preferred, at least at this stage in
research, for pragmatic reasons.
In terms of increased likelihood of success, members
of both the Swedish and Japanese teams have noted that,
just as living related donation in kidney and partial liver
transplantation leads to better patient outcomes and
long-term graft survival rates, and decreases the need for
strong immunosuppressive regimes, it is highly likely that
the same benefits will be obtained from living-related
donation in UTx.26 In cases of unrelated donation they
also suggest living donors should be preferred on the
basis of results of long-term studies of graft survival
rates after kidney donation showing that kidneys
obtained from living unrelated donors still provide better
patient outcomes than those from deceased donors.
Brannstrom et al. suggest this may be because brain
death induces systemic inflammation that negatively
affects organ quality27 and Kisu et al. propose that, as
removal of non-vital organs must occur after the removal
of vital organs for transplantation, inevitable increases in
warm ischemia time may reduce organ quality and func-
tion.28 The Swedish team also suggest that the use of liv-
ing donors lessens the risk of transplanting uteri that are
unsuitable for gestation, allowing for meticulous diag-
nostic work-up of the uterine graft to exclude patholo-
gies that could interfere with fertility potential and the
choice of a uterine graft that has proved its functionality
in terms of normal pregnancies.29
The Swedish team also provide three pragmatic rea-
sons for their preference. In regards to the first, they sug-
gest that there are too few deceased donors to make
UTx using deceased donors an option in Sweden.30 Sta-
tistics regarding posthumous donation in Sweden are
amongst the lowest in Europe, even after a switch to an
opt-out policy in 1996. Thus, whilst it is unlikely that
there would be too few deceased donors for a small-scale
research trial in Sweden, should UTx reach clinical appli-
cation it is likely the case that demand for deceased
donor uteri would outstrip supply. Secondly, they sug-
gested that due to their experience of living donation in
animal studies, the use of living donors would be prefera-
ble for them, although this might not be the case else-
where.31 Finally, they suggested that dependent on
research context there may be additional practical rea-
sons to prefer the use of living donors. Brannstrom
notes:
. . .our team with surgeons from three continents had
to plan the exact dates of our surgeries well in
advance. Furthermore, our hospital board required
that all surgeries be done during weekends in operat-
ing theatres that were usually closed on weekends.
17 Fageeh et al., op. cit. note 4, p. 247.
18 O. Ozkan et al. Preliminary Results of the First HumanUterus Trans-
plantation from aMultiorganDonor. Fertil Steril 2013; 99: 470.
19 Brannstrom et al., op. cit. note 6, p. 1228.
20 S. Rivers. El ginecologo Cesar Dıaz: El trasplante de utero ben-
eficiarıa a una de 4.000mujeres en Espa~na. 20Minutos Espa~na, 7 October
2014. Available at: http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/2258498/0/gineco-
logo-espanol/primer-trasplante-utero/nacimiento-bebe/ [accessed 1
November 2015].
21 Kisu et al., op. cit. note 7.
22 Smith, op. cit. note 8.
23 Czub, op. cit. note 9.
24 Anon. Gent wil baarmoeders transplanteren. De Standaard, 11
December 2014. Available at: http://www.standaard.be/cnt/
dmf20141210_01422982 [Accessed 1 November 2015].
25 Nair et al., op. cit. note 11, p. 86.
26 M. Brannstrom, C.A.Wranning &A. Altcheck. Experimental Uterus
Transplantation. Hum Reprod Update 2010; 16: 340.; Kisu et al., op. cit.
note 7, p. 287.
27 M. Brannstrom. Uterus Transplantation. Fertil Steril 2013; 99: 348.
28 Kisu et al., op. cit. note 7, p. 288.
29 Brannstrom et al., op. cit. note 6, p. 1235.
30 Anon. Woman Gives Birth after Receiving Womb Transplant. Irish
Times, 4 October 2014. Available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
health/woman-gives-birth-after-receiving-womb-transplant-1.1952400#
[accessed 29 June 2015].
31 Brannstrom et al., op. cit. note 24, p. 340.
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Deceased donor UTx would not be an option under
these conditions.32
2.2 A preference for deceased donors –
Turkey, The US and the UK
Those who prefer the use of deceased donors also offer
reasons for their preference, which, in certain cases, con-
tradict those provided by teams preferring living dona-
tion. As with those the Swedish and Japanese teams
provide, these have primarily been based in considera-
tions of pragmatism and the suggestion that the use of
deceased donor uteri is just as, if not more likely, to
prove successful.
Regarding the likelihood of success, despite the only
successful pregnancies in humans occurring in recipients
of uteri obtained from living donors, some who prefer
the use of deceased donors have pointed to the fact that
during the animal model stage of UTx research, and in
the Saudi case, a major barrier to successful transplanta-
tion has been necrosis caused by thrombosis in the ves-
sels supplying blood to the uterus. It was found that in
order to reduce the likelihood of thrombosis longer
lengths of vasculature should be used; these are most
easily and effectively obtained from deceased donors as
the large abdominal vena cava can be removed from
deceased but not living donors.33 Some view this consid-
eration as decisive and Smith and Del Priori – the lead-
ers of the UK and New York teams - have stated
categorically that: the uterus for transplantation is best
obtained from a deceased donor and not a live donor.34
Others draw attention to the fact that, despite the claims
of the Swedish and Japanese teams that living donation
should be preferred in terms of long-term graft survival,
such benefits are questionable as the procedure is
designed to be ephemeral (removed after one or two
pregnancies). The Turkish team, for example have looked
at the results of a meta-analysis of data regarding graft
survival rates in organ and composite tissue transplants
which shows that, whilst organs obtained from the living
do tend to survive longer than those from deceased
donors due to tissue matching and organ quality factors,
these show only very minimal effects on five-year graft
survival rates35 and thus provide little reason to prefer
living donors.
A number of practical reasons have also been offered
in favour of the use of deceased donors, focusing mainly
on there being a larger potential pool of deceased donors
for UTx, the surgery for retrieval of organs being far less
complex and there being no risk of harm to the donor.
Indeed, although the latter may be couched as an ethical
reason to prefer deceased over living donation of uteri (a
reason discussed in forthcoming sections) there is also a
practical element to this consideration. Removal of the
risk of serious complications and mortality in donors by
using only uteri obtained from the deceased negates the
risk of research being forcibly abandoned due to this.
Del Priore and Gudipudi note:
. . .each time a living donor suffers a severe complica-
tion from donation, even of a life saving liver trans-
plant, this inevitable occurrence typically shuts down
even the best transplantation programs and predicts
that as such the death of a living uterus donor
would end this nascent era of human uterus
transplantation.36
3. SHOULD DECEASED DONATION BE
ETHICALLY PREFERRED IN UTX
RESEARCH?
As might thus be garnered, whether deceased or living
donors should be preferred on grounds of pragmatism or
increased likelihood of success in UTx trials is difficult
to answer with certainty. Yet, despite this, some may
hold that even if the use of living donors can be shown
to be more practicable/successful, deceased donors would
still be preferable on the basis of ethical considerations
such as the harms that may be suffered by living donors,
concerns regarding donor consent, and the possibility of
regret. Such considerations will now be explored and
examined.
3.1 Harms to uterus donors
Discussions in the UTx literature regarding whether liv-
ing or deceased donors should be preferred all have one
thing in common: an acknowledgement of the fact, and
an expression of concern that, whilst retrieval of uteri
from the deceased poses no risk of donor harm, this is
not the case with living donation. Retrieval from the liv-
ing necessitates physical harm to the donor and includes
small but not insignificant risks of long-term morbidity
and mortality thought similar to, or only slightly higher
than that of a total abdominal hysterectomy.37 These
include possible damage to the ureter and intestines,38
complications associated with general anaesthesia, psy-
chological problems such as loss of gender identity, and
a risk of sexual dysfunction associated with hysterectomy
32 Brannstrom et al., op. cit. note 6, p. 1234.
33 G. Del Priore & D.K. Gudipudi. Promise of Uterine Transplant -
Myth or a Reality?Maturitas 2014; 7: 22.
34 Nair et al., op. cit. note 11, p. 86.
35 Ozkan et al., op. cit. note 18, p. 474.
36 Del Priore &Gudipudi, op. cit. note 31, p. 22.
37 M. Olausson et al. Ethics of Uterus Transplantation with Live
Donors. Fertil Steril 2014; 102: 42.
38 Brannstrom, op. cit. note 25, p. 348.
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such as a decrease in sexual satisfaction, interest, arousal
and orgasm.39
For some, notably the Japanese and Swedish teams,
whilst the use of living donors adds another key element
into a risk-benefit analysis concerning uterus trans-
plantation,40 the possible harms that may befall living
donors are thought justified, provided certain background
conditions are met. Yet for others, such as the Interna-
tional Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics
(FIGO), that the retrieval of a uterus from a living donor
necessitates a relatively major surgery with its own risk
of complications41 constitutes reason enough to deem
the procedure ethically inappropriate.42
Appeals to harm, however, are not likely to be as
straightforward as the prescriptions of FIGO might sug-
gest. For, although the retrieval of uteri from living
donors causes donor harm and provides no medical ben-
efit, holding an obligation of non-maleficence as absolute
seems far too strong and is not in keeping with current
medical practice. The living donation of non-vital organs
and parts of certain vital organs has been permitted in
certain circumstances since the dawn of the transplanta-
tion era and the use of living donors for single kidney
transplantation is now so commonplace that in the UK
over one third of kidneys for transplantation are so
obtained.43 Phase one clinical research trials of medicine
and certain other interventions also routinely use healthy
volunteers – that is, individuals with no current need for
treatment with the drug/intervention concerned – in
order to test for safety and possible side effects before
subsequent phases in specific clinical populations. In
such trials volunteers expose themselves to small risks of
sometimes significant harm and the dominant position
among those concerned with the ethics of clinical trials
involving healthy subjects is that, provided certain back-
ground conditions are met, exposure to such risks is
justified.
Thus, unless the above practices are to be roundly con-
demned, mere acknowledgement of the harms and risks
associated with the living donation of uteri cannot, for
reasons of consistency, prove a decisive reason against
this practice. Instead, it must be shown that UTx trials
are somehow different from accepted instances of living
donation and clinical trials using human volunteers: that
one or some number of the grounds often invoked as jus-
tifying their use in these contexts (and, indeed, many
others), fails to apply in the case of UTx.
3.1.1 Justifying harm in the contexts of living vital
organ donation and clinical research using healthy
volunteers
A number of criteria have been proposed as providing
justification, when met, for the imposition of harm in
cases of living donation and participation in research tri-
als. Of these, appeals to one or some number of the fol-
lowing three tend to dominate:
(a) Valid Consent: The vast majority of scholars con-
cerned with research/transplantation ethics hold that
a necessary condition for justified living donation/
research participation is the provision of valid con-
sent on the part of donors/participants.44 For some
libertarian scholars this requirement is also thought
to prove sufficient as it is held that – provided an
individual is in possession of the capacities and infor-
mation required for autonomous choice and gives his
free, voluntary, and undeceived consent45 – he may
just as easily consent to causing himself/being caused
harm as he may to furnishing himself with benefits.46
For most however, valid consent, whilst necessary, is
not sufficient for justified donation/participation and
is thus combined with one or both of the conditions
(b) and (c) that follow.
(b) Favourable harm-benefit ratio (aggregative): Another
common proposal is that, necessary for justified
research participation/donation involving living vol-
unteers, is that their use can be expected to provide
an all-things-considered benefit for all those with a
stake in the research/donation.47 This view tends to
have its basis in the consequentialist view that the
infliction of harm on one/some will be justifiable
where it can reasonably be expected to secure greater
benefits for others.48 Whilst on the simplest version
of this view all that is required for justified donation/
39 Kisu et al., op. cit. note 7, p. 288.
40 Brannstrom et al., op. cit. note 13, pp. 607-616
41 FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction
and Women's Health. FIGO Committee Report: Uterine Transplanta-
tion. Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2009; 106: 270.
42 Ibid.
43 NHS Blood And Transplant. 2014. Organ Donation and Transplan-
tation Activity Report 2013/14. London: NHS: 37.
44 For examples of the few scholars who view that valid consent is not a
necessary condition of morally permissible donation/research on living
volunteers see: C. Fabre. 2006.Whose Body Is It Anyway? Justice and the
Integrity of the Person. Oxford: Clarendon Press; E. Rakowski. 1991.
Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
45 J.S. Mill. 1977. On Liberty. In The Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill vol. XVIII. J.M. Robson, ed. London: Routledge: 225.
46 Perhaps the most notable proponent of this view is John Harris who
has suggested in numerous papers that on the basis of respect for individ-
ual autonomy the living should be permitted to donate even vital organs
such as hearts. See, for example: J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and
Superman - the Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press: 113.
47 See, for example: W. Glannon & L.F. Ross. Response to Intrafamilial
Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act by Aaron Spital (Cq Vol. 12,
No. 1) and Donor Benefit Is the Key to Justified Living Organ Dona-
tion by Aaron Spital (Cq Vol. 13, No. 1). Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2005;
14: 193.
48 I note that this tends to be the case in virtue of the fact that it may also
rest on non-aggregative considerations such as straightforward benefi-
cence or some version of the rule of rescue.
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participation is the production of a net benefit,49 for
most, if not all, proponents of this view: that a net
benefit results is not sufficient to justify the harms
inflicted. Thus, (b) also tends to require that: the
harms inflicted are:
( i) Necessary to secure the benefit sought50 (which
involves both careful consideration of possible
and similarly beneficial alternatives to the use of
living donors/volunteers such as the use of
deceased donors or other treatment options in
transplantation and other research models in
clinical research);
( ii) Minimized only to those necessary.51
As in (a), those who hold both the weaker
and stronger versions of this view may vari-
ously suggest that it is both necessary and suf-
ficient for justified research/donation or that,
whilst individually necessary, (b) is not suffi-
cient and must be paired with (a) and/or (c).
(c) Sufficiently good harm-benefit ratio (non-aggrega-
tive: donor/volunteer focused): Whilst rarely sug-
gested as a necessary and sufficient condition for
justified living donation and research, held in tandem
with (a) and/or (b) is the view that key to justified don-
ation/participation lies in the production of a suffi-
ciently good ratio of harm-benefit for the donor him/
herself. What counts as favourable on this view differs
greatly dependent on who one asks, but normally
comes in the following forms. Within transplantation
ethics literature some suggest that that living donation
is only justifiable where donors receive a net benefit or,
at least, are not harmed on balance by their donation.52
Others suggest, less strongly, that a threshold should
be placed on the extent to which a donor/volunteer
may be harmed as a result of their donation, suggest-
ing that although donation procedures and experi-
ments which result in net harm to the donor may be
permitted there is a point at which the harms become
unacceptably grave.53 Although none have specified
this threshold, it is generally suggested that the most
risky of currently performed living donation proce-
dures (living liver lobe, partial lung transplants) fall
somewhere near the limits of acceptable harms and
risks and that procedures such as living second kid-
ney54 and heart donation,55 fall outside of them. Less
strongly still, and more commonly, especially within
the research ethics literature, is the suggestion that
although a favourable or neutral balance of benefit to
burden is unnecessary for justified living donation/
research,56 attempts should be made, where possible,
to maximize the benefits donors and volunteers
receive as a result of their donation/participation.57
3.1.2 Are the harms to living donors in UTx
justifiable?
With the above in mind, it seems that if the living dona-
tion of uteri is to be deemed ethically inappropriate on
the grounds of the harms and risks imposed on donors,
such a complaint is most likely to take one or some num-
ber of the following forms:
(a) Consent: The harms associated with living uterus don-
ation are unjustifiable as they are not of a kind or inten-
sity to which the donor may provide valid consent.
(b) Favourable Harm – Benefit Ratio (donor/recipient):
In the case of UTx the potential benefits to the
recipient and future recipients fail to outweigh the
harms the donor may suffer and/or are unneces-
sary in order to achieve the desired benefit.
(c) Balance of Harms and Benefit (donor): In the
case of UTx the harms to the donor are too
grave, and the benefits: not maximised and/or fail
to compensate for the harms she may suffer.
Of the complaints listed above, (a) – suggesting that the
harms associatedwith uterus donationmay not be of a kind
or intensity to which a donor may provide valid consent – is
undoubtedly the weakest. For, although there is much
debate within the literature on the ethics of living donation
regarding the limits of both respect for autonomy and of
autonomy itself – and such debates provide valuable insight
when considering the question of whether individuals
should be permitted to donate second kidneys or hearts –
engagement with this debate is highly unlikely to provide
sufficient reason to prefer deceased over living donation in
49 See, for example: P. Reese et al. Creating a Medical, Ethical, and
Legal Framework for Complex Living Kidney Donors. Clin J Am Soc
Nephrol 2006; 1: 1150.
50 See, for example: E.J. Emanuel, D. Wendler & C. Grady.What Makes
Clinical Research Ethical. JAMA 2000; 283: 2705 & R. Sauder & L.S.
Parker. Autonomy's Limits: Living Donation andHealth Related Harm.
CambQHealthc Ethics 2001; 10: 405–406.
51 See, for example: National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research. 1978. The Belmont
Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Research. Washington DC: Department of Health Education and
Welfare: United States Government: 17 & Emanuel et al., op. cit. note 48,
p. 2705.
52 A. Spital. Donor Benefit Is the Key to Justified Living Organ Dona-
tion.CambQHealthc Ethics 2004; 13: 108.
53 C. Elliott. Doing Harm: Living Organ Donors, Clinical Research and
the TenthMan. J.Med Ethics 1995; 21: 91–96.
54 Sauder & Parker, op. cit. note 48, pp. 404–405.
55 Elliott, op. cit. note 51, p. 92.
56 Indeed, many scholars concerned with research ethics would view
that the stronger requirement that participants must benefit from their
participation may constitute undue inducement. Whether or not this is
justified however, is up for debate and there is considerable disagreement
among scholars concerning appropriate levels of compensation for
research participants. See: M. Wilkinson & A. Moore. Inducement in
Research. Bioethics 1997; 11: 373–389.
57 Emanuel et al., op. cit. note 48, p. 2705.
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UTx. The living uterus donor does not, after all, offer to
subject herself to anything like the risks associatedwith such
procedures and does not even offer subjection to the kinds
of risks associated with already accepted forms of living
donation such as single kidney transplants. Consequently,
although the risks of living donation in UTx may well have
been underplayed by the research teams performing/prepar-
ingUTx trials, it seems improbable that consideration of the
limits of autonomywill provide goodmoral reason to prefer
the use of deceased donors in the case ofUTx.
Similarly, for those who hold there is more involved in justi-
fied living organ donation or participation in medical research
than a donors/participants informed and voluntary consent,58
an appeal to (c) is also unlikely to provide reason to con-
demn the use of living donors in UTx. Although overall
benefit for donors cannot be guaranteed, as above there is
little reason to presume that the harms she will suffer as a
result of her donation will fall below some permissible
threshold, or to suggest that living uterus donors cannot
receive an all-things-considered benefit from their donation.
Donor benefit is often viewed as sufficient to allow non-
directed living kidney donation by strangers and such don-
ation provides only the benefits associated with selfless acts
of helping such as increased self-esteem.59 Thus, given that
infertility and an inability to gestate may have a devastating
impact on individual welfare, with those experiencing it
often feeling distress, depression, loss of gender identity and
an enduring sense of incompleteness and grief,60 it seems
there is good reason to assume that the benefits accrued to
living donors, especially where donors and recipients share
a close personal relationship, will prove sufficient. Such
benefits may include but are not limited to: knowing that
one has done all one can to provide a loved one the oppor-
tunity to fulfil a strong and deeply held desire and to allevi-
ate the suffering brought on by the frustration of that
desire, as well as fulfilling ones own desire to become a
grandmother/aunt and watch said loved one experience
pregnancy and birth etc.61 Indeed, even in cases of altruistic
living donation by strangers it is easy to imagine a woman
who appreciates the value of gestation and has already
completed her own family gaining significant pleasure and
pride from knowledge that she had assisted another in ful-
filling her desire to gestate and grow her family.62
If donor benefit may outweigh donor harm in the case of
UTx, it may be safely assumed that so too will recipient/
possible future recipient benefit often straightforwardly
outweigh donor harm. After all, the benefits received by
such parties, where the transplant proves successful, are
likely to be far greater in both intensity and duration than
those accrued to the donor. Similarly, should UTx not
prove a viable treatment option for UFI, the knowledge
gained from the trial may provide some comfort to those
experiencing it, helping them to accept their inability to ges-
tate, and choose among options already available to them
as all possible treatment avenueswill have been exhausted.
Whether living donation in UTx satisfies the require-
ments of necessity and harm minimization may, however,
be questioned. With reference to supply and demand, for
example, it does not seem to be the case that there is cur-
rently a need – as in other living donation contexts – to
resort to the use of living donors in UTx. Demand for
donor uteri has, after all, reached only 11 uteri at this
point and transplantations can be performed at a rela-
tively leisurely pace given that UTx is both an experi-
mental procedure and aims to treat a condition that,
although distressing, is not life limiting.63 Of course, this
is not to say that should UTx reach clinical application
58 Should the reader strongly hold, like Harris, that this is not the case, it
is suggested that a skip to the next section, which concerns issues of
donor consent and regret, may be in order.
59 Spital, op. cit. note 50, p. 107.
60 See for example: L. Lechner, C. Bolman, & A. Van Dalen. Definite
Involuntary Childlessness: Associations between Coping, Social Sup-
port and Psychological Distress.HumReprod 2007; 22: 288–294.
61 Olausson et al., op. cit. note 35, p. 42.
62 Whilst some might question this suggestion during telephone calls
with Mats Brannstrom (of the Swedish team) and Richard Smith (of the
UK team) both informed the author that they have received numerous
offers from women who would be willing to become altruistic living
uterus donors for women with UFI.
63 It should be noted here that absent from this section is consideration
of the question of whether the status of UTx as a quality of life as
opposed to a vital organ transplant may cast doubt on the appropriate-
ness of the use of living as opposed to deceased donors given that its pur-
pose is not primarily to prolong lives, nor to treat a pathology that
necessarily impacts on the quality of life of an organism as in most kid-
ney transplants, but to treat a physical disorder whose impact on quality
of life is contingent on the psychological attributes and desires of those
who experience it. This critique of the use of living donors in UTx has
not been fully unpacked within the literature although it was hinted at
by Del Priore and Gudipudi when, in a paper regarding the deceased
donor concept for UTx, they noted: in general, the transplant commu-
nity would never consider a living donor for anything less essential than
a kidneyor part of a liver. Whether or not this difference may cast doubt
on the appropriateness of the use of living donors in UTx depends on
whether a satisfactory argument can be provided in favour of the claim
that the interests served and the benefits provided to the uterus recipient
are of less gravity than those served and provided by vital organ trans-
plantation. That such an argument can be provided however, is unlikely.
That living donors are generally not utilized in QOL transplantation
contexts likely has less to do with their status as QOL and more to do
with the fact that one would be unlikely to find a willing living donor or
a favourable harm-benefit ratio in most other QOL contexts such as
hand, face, cornea or larynx donation. This is not so with the possession
of a uterus as for those who have already completed their families or
who do not desire to gestate, the uterus is expendable. Indeed, the use of
living donors in QOL transplantation contexts has already been sanc-
tioned in the case of the ovary transplant (a similarly expendable organ)
and so too is risk of harm commonly imposed on living volunteers in tri-
als of medications and interventions that aim to provide purely psycho-
logical benefits to clinical populations. Consequently, it is unclear why
the relatively novel status of UTx among transplantation procedures for
which living donors are currently used should provide moral reason to
prefer the use of deceased donors. See: Del Priore & Gudipudi, op. cit.
note 31, p. 22.
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there may not be a shortage of deceased donor uteri for
transplantation. Thus, it may be suggested that because
shortage in clinical practice has been foreseen there are
good reasons to use both the living and deceased donor
concepts in research.
Appeals to the second practical sense of necessity –
the provision of additional benefits – may also be used
to justify living donation in this case. Due to the experi-
mental nature of the procedure, such benefits are cur-
rently uncertain and it may be found in the future that
even if living donation in UTx is more likely to prove
successful or leads to better patient outcomes, the addi-
tional benefits that the use of living donors provides may
not be sufficient to outweigh the harms of donation in
the face of slightly less beneficial but far less risky alter-
natives. However, given that there are good scientific rea-
sons backing up the claim that the use of organs
obtained from living donors may prove more efficacious,
research into this possibility, using both living related/
unrelated and deceased donors does seem justifiable pro-
vided researchers use minimally invasive methods of
retrieval, by for example, exploring laparoscopic and
robot assisted donations in living volunteers.
3.2 Consent, voluntariness and regret
As noted previously, consideration of the limits of respect
for individual autonomy will not provide a solid reason
to prefer the use of deceased donors. Living donors may
just as easily provide consent to uterus retrieval as they
may to the retrieval of organs such as kidneys and liver
lobes, provided they possess both the capacities and infor-
mation required to make an informed choice.
Despite this, it may be suggested that it is still preferable
to use deceased donors in UTx in order to avoid risking
the possibility that living donors in UTx may be used in
instances where – due to poor institutional procedures/
safeguards, and/or despite appearances to contrary – their
consent to donate is not fully informed and/or wholly vol-
untary. After all, living donation in UTx does risk the pos-
sibility that donors may be coerced or manipulated into
donation by those holding stakes in their donation and
that they may also feel an internal pressure to donate even
in the absence of actively coercive or manipulative acts.
That living donation in UTx poses such risks is
acknowledged in the literature by parties on both sides of
the debate. Kisu et al. note that, unlike deceased donors,
living donors. . .have the burden that they may experience
pressure to give and take the uterus.64 Lefkowitz et al.
suggest similarly: If the donor is a live donor, issues arise
with informed consent of the donor relating to organ don-
ation in general and specific to the donation of a uterus.65
Caplan holds too that the use of living donors increases
the risk of coercion and adds: There could also be poten-
tial problems if a family member initially consents to
being a uterus donor and then changes her mind.66 Cat-
sanos et al. echo such sentiments but suggest not all forms
of living uterus donation are equally risky, holding that
altruistic donation by strangers and those already under-
going a hysterectomy can reduce concerns over coerced
consent,67 although without the immunological benefits
associated with living related donation.
Even where valid and informed consent is provided,
concerns have also surfaced regarding the possibility of
donor regret. This has mainly been articulated by blog
commentators on UTx but is also acknowledged by Cat-
sanos et al. who note:
There is. . . a risk for uterus donors in that a uterus
is only expendable if the potential donor is unequiv-
ocally certain that she will not now nor in the future
desire another pregnancy herself. . . some of the
women who responded to news of UTx had chosen
hysterectomy as the solution to a medical problem,
thinking they had completed their families, only to
find themselves in a new relationship and desirous of
having children with their new partner.68
For some, the possibility of regret might prove less rele-
vant in determining the acceptability of living trans-
plants. Regret is often an inevitable part of life and
paternalistic attempts to save individuals from future
harms by curtailing their freedom in the present often
prove self defeating, as individuals are often in the best,
albeit non-ideal, position to know how likely they are to
regret their choices.
However, regardless of whether one views regret as rel-
evant to determinations of the ethical permissibility of
the use of living donors in UTx, it should be noted that
concerns regarding coercion and regret are not unique to
living uterus donation. They arise in multiple contexts
ranging from the exciting, such as the living donation of
organs and tissues generally and surrogacy arrangements,
to the mundane, such as marriages, employment, loans,
house purchases. In such contexts however, the dominant
position of those concerned with their ethics is not the
implementation of a precautionary approach to risk pre-
vention but instead the provision of robust mechanisms
and safeguards designed to protect against and thus min-
imize the occurrence of instances where the consent of a
donor has been undercut and donor regret. Certainty
regarding consent of another can never be obtained given
that it is both a propositional attitude69 and it is
64 Kisu et al., op. cit. note 7, p. 288.
65 Lefkowitz et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 433.
66 A. L. Caplan.Moving theWomb.Hastings Cent Rep 2007; 37: 19.
67 R. Catsanos, W. Rogers & M. Lotz. The Ethics of Uterus Transplan-
tation.Bioethics 2013; 27: 71.
68 Ibid.
69 O. O'Neill. Some Limits of Informed Consent. J. Med Ethics 2002;
29: 4–7.
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impossible to fully don the mental mantle of another.
However, steps can be taken to significantly reduce the
risk of coercion, manipulation and internal compulsion
and regret.
With this in mind it is suggested that researchers in
UTx trials draw on pre-existing criteria for informed con-
sent from both transplantation and research contexts
when designing living UTx trials and consider implement-
ing additional safeguards relevant to UTx. Such require-
ments are thus likely to include but may not be limited to:
1. The provision of verbal and written information
from research teams and demonstration of under-
standing on the part of the donor regarding:
(a) The medical, social and financial risks of
donation;
(b) The likelihood of success and the risk of mor-
bidity and mortality for the recipient;
(c) Possible alternative sources of donor organs
for the recipient such as deceased and living
donors already undergoing hysterectomies
and alternative means of begetting children
such as adoption and surrogacy.
2. Repeated and consistent attestation on the part of
the donor regarding a desire to donate.
3. Confidential evaluation of donor by physicians and
psychologists separate to the research trial and
absent the presence of family members, friends and
members of the research team with a stake in the
donation to ensure competence, voluntariness and
donor advocacy. This may include allowing and
supporting the telling of a lie regarding incompat-
ibility or medical contraindications from the begin-
ning of assessment until the transplant procedure
in order to remove fear of blame from family mem-
bers if they do not wish to donate but are worried
about the consequences of failing to do so.
4. The use only of donors who are older, post-
menopausal and/or already undergoing a hysterectomy
in order to minimize the potential for donor regret.70
In cases where centres lack the resources or institu-
tional stability71 required to afford such protections to
donors, the possibility of a failure to obtain informed
consent and regret may provide adequate reason to sug-
gest that only deceased donors should be used. Indeed,
this may also be the case dependent on the location of
the trial in question. In lower income and more pro-
natalistic societies Mumtaz and Levay note that risks of
coercion and manipulation of potential uterus donors
may be greater than in other societies due to a combina-
tion of less well-developed/funded mechanisms for
informed and voluntary consent and a higher value
afforded to parenthood. They note, for example, that in
Pakistan childlessness is often viewed as socially unac-
ceptable and that women who cannot produce children
are liable to experience physical and emotional abuse
from their husbands and in-laws. As such, women who
have already completed their families or who are single
and well past marriageable age may experience far
greater pressure both externally and internally to donate
to relatives/friends who find themselves in this precarious
position.72
Although consideration of the above may lead some
to hold that it may always be morally preferable to use
deceased donors in order to bypass concerns of coercion,
manipulation and internal compulsion, it has been sug-
gested that the use of deceased donors in UTx trials
may, in certain circumstances, raise similar problems.
Caplan, for example, raises an interesting point regarding
the appropriateness of presuming consent to donate a
uterus in those who have signed a donor card prior to
their death. He asks:
. . .is this really enough? Few, if any, American
women ever thought that the uterus might be one of
the organs considered for donation when they signed
a donor card. A woman might not prove as willing
to donate her uterus as she would be to donate her
heart or liver.73
Caplans question highlights the importance of taking
into account both the novelty and relatively unknown
status of UTx and the fact that individuals often hold
complex preferences regarding donation such that they
may be less willing to donate non-vital rather than vital
organs after their death and may be more averse still to
donating reproductive organs. That individuals who have
70 The content of the requirements that follow have been based on UK
and international guidance regarding informed consent in both research
and transplantation contexts as well as the criteria put forward in the
Montreal Criteria For The Ethical Feasibility of Uterine Transplanta-
tion and the research design for the Swedish UTx Trial explored in vari-
ous journal articles and at the COGI workshop on Uterine
Transplantation. See, for example: Lefkowitz et al., op. cit. note 2, pp.
439–447; Lefkowitz et al. Ethical Considerations in the Era of the Uter-
ine Transplant: An Update of the Montreal Criteria for the Ethical Fea-
sibility of Uterine Transplantation. Fertil Steril 2013; 100: 924–926; L.
Johannesson. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria of UTxDonors and Preoper-
ative Investigations. at The 19th World Congress on Controversies in
Obstetrics, Gynaecology and Infertility 2014. Available at: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v5swXPnu-jtFo [accessed 29 June 2015]; National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioural Research, op. cit. note 49, pp. 11–14;WorldMedical Associ-
ation. Declaration of Helsinki. Bull World Health Organ 2001; 79: 373–
374; Human Tissue Authority. 2015. Guidance to Transplant Teams and
Independent Assessors. London: Department of Health.
71 For an exploration of the importance of institutional stability for sur-
gical research and innovation see F. D. Moore. Ethical Problems Special
to Surgery.Arch Surg 2000; 135: 14–16.
72 Z.Mumtaz &A. Levay. Ethics Criteria for Uterine Transplants: Rele-
vance for Low-Income, Pronatalistic Societies?, J Clin Res Bioeth 2012;
S1: 3.
73 Caplan, op. cit. note 63, p. 19.
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joined the organ donor register may hold complex pref-
erences regarding donation is illustrated easily by refer-
ring to the UK NHS Transplant Activity Report.
Although the report shows 88% of registered donors are
willing to donate all organs and tissues posthumously, a
significant minority of 12% are selective regarding the
types of organs and tissues they will donate. Of this
minority, 88%, for example, are unwilling to donate their
corneas, and 23% refuse to donate pancreases and
hearts.74
Despite this, the stakes involved in ensuring the con-
sent of living donors do seem greater than those involved
in deceased donation. Unless we hold that our identities
are grounded in some separately existing, noumenal
entity – such as a soul or Cartesian ego – the suggestion
that a person may be caused harm by acts done to their
bodies after death is nonsensical. After all, since for the
time when [they] are, death is not present; and for the
time when death is present, [they] are not.75 Of course,
this is not to say there are no moral reasons to respect
an individuals wish not to donate their organs posthu-
mously. The knowledge, after all, that a preference
against post-humous organ donation is liable to be
ignored may cause that individual great distress and so
too would such removal distress family members posthu-
mously should they know and/or share his preference.
Yet, that we are concerned with ensuring consent on the
part of the deceased to donate seems, if anything, to lend
strength to the claim that – where consent from the liv-
ing to donate is in question – the use of deceased donors
should still be preferred. For, the negative consequences
arising from failure to obtain informed consent in cases
of living donation are of significantly more gravity.
4 CONCLUSION
Within this article I have sought to provide an answer to
the question of whether deceased donation should be
preferred in UTx trials given that the use of living
donors in UTx trials is both necessarily harmful to
donors and risks the possibility of failures to attain fully
informed consent and donor regret. In general, my
response to this question is positive: there exist pro tanto
reasons to prefer the use of deceased donors.
However, whilst this is so, as with all pro tanto reasons,
a moral preference for deceased donation only goes so
far. The imposition of harm on living volunteers/donors
in research and organ transplantation contexts may be –
and indeed, often is – justified by appeals to the value of
respect for individual autonomy, a favourable balance of
harm and benefit between donors and recipients/stake-
holders, and a favourable balance of harm and benefit
for donors themselves. Thus, unless we are to roundly
condemn existing organ donation and research practices,
there seems little reason to suggest that, at this stage in
research, the harms and risks imposed on living donors
in UTx trials cannot be justified by appeals to such con-
siderations. Similarly, as concerns regarding consent and
regret plague virtually all research and transplantation
contexts, and few suggest a precautionary approach
should be implemented in order to protect against such
risks, there seems little reason to assume precaution
should prevail in the case of UTx, provided robust mech-
anisms and safeguards are implemented that reduce such
risks.
Of course, this is not to say that, once trials are com-
pleted, the use of living donors will still be justifiable.
For, should it be the case that there is both no shortage
of deceased donor uteri and the use of living donors is
no more likely/only slightly more likely to prove success-
ful, those who hold that justified living donation requires
a favourable balance of harm-benefit for donors may
claim, with good reason, that living donors should not
be utilized.
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